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PROSPECTS FOR AN INTERNPTIONAL ECONOMY
It is always a pleasant event when Gunnar Myrdal publishes a book,
and considering his onerous duties as Director-General of the Economic
Commission for Europe, so comprehensive a work as An International
Economy was an event we had no right to expect. It is therefore a doubly
welcome addition to the growing postwar literature on international
economics. This literature is quite different in scope from the prewar
literature in the sarme field. One of the striking features of Professor
Myrdal' s newest work--considering that he wrote it when plunged up to his
eyebrows in European problems--is thet so much of it is directed towards
problems of underdeveloped areas.
The book is encyclopaedic in scope, but has a connecting theme: the
disintegration of the world economy since 1913 and the need to do something
about it. Myrdal frankly states at the outset that his analysis rests on
a value judgment: thet economic integration is a "good thing", and that
equality of opportunity is the keystone of economic integration. A second
value judgment is "that the attainment and preservwtion of a democratic
form of government is desirable" (p.15). The countries in the Soviet orbit
are far from being free according to our standrds, Professor Myrdal adds,
and for the most part the book is concerned only with countries outside this
orbit.
Myrdal recognizes that internrtional integration must be based on
national integration. In his view traditional internationalism, seeking a
short-cut to international integration by abolishing national economic
policy, is both reactionary and ineffective (p. 52). National integration
has already been realized in large measure in advanced countries. Unfortun-
ately, Myrdel Prgues, the form of nationalism has been such as to impede
internationalism. The one major effort at international integration since
the war--the program for Wcst European Cooperation--was essentially a
failure. The system of internrtional payments thtrt prevailed before
World War I has broken down, and neither labor nor capital now moves with
the same freedom as it did in the early twentieth century. The cold war
has retarded internationalization of foreign aid, has destabilized interna-
tional commodity markets by encouraging an erratic stock-piling policy, and
has undermined the liberal foundations of Western culture. In this gloory
picbure the "drive for independence and development" of underdeveloped
countries, and the efforts of the West to help them do it, is a relatively
bright spot. Even here, however, there are flaws in the canvas,
It is not possible to deal adequately in a single article with the whole
range of ideas in this stimulating book; it is necessary to select a few.
The reviewer has decided to concentrate on those international relationships
which interest him most--especially since he knows that they also represent
Professor Myrdal's major interest--viz., the relationship between advanced
countries (especially the United States) and the underdeveloped ones
This field is itself broad enough. Within it, the reviewer has limited
himself to four topics: foreif-n aid policy; trade versus aid; conmercial
policy of underdeveloped countries; and the special role of the United
States.
Foreign A id Policy
Myrdal is critical of the "to him who hath shall be given" principle
which has guided foreign aid during the first postwar decade. The United
States has been the chief donor, but the greater p, rt of its donations,
including most of the Marshall aid, has not gone to the underdeveloped
regions. The point is well taken. From the end of the war to the end of
fiscpl 1954 net loans and grants from the United Str tes reached a total
of 46,847,000, Of this amount, $12,181,000 went for straight military
grants. Something under t1,000 million of the total represents contri
butions to international agencies, leaving some 34 billion as clear
cut bileteral capital assistance for economic reconstruction and development.
Thirty-four billion dollers is a substpntial sum; but most of this
amount consists of Mershall Aid to Europe. Some 4W25 billion of the total
went to Western Europe, mainly for reconstruction purposes. This region
includes some countries, such as Greece, Italy, Turkey and Yugoslavia,
that could properly be considered underdeveloped; but these countries
received together less than '5,0O0 million, or less than 5 per cent of the
total aid to Western countries, and of this fraction the largest share went
to Italy, whose claim to be "underdeveloped" is least strong among coun-
tries in this group. The biggest sums went to such advanced countries as
the United Kingdom, France, and Western Germany.! The Near East and
Africa received less than 1.5 per cent of the total, and some three-
fifths of this sum went to Israel. the country with the highest per capita
income in the region. Asia and the Pacific were accoried some 13 per cent
of the total, but over half of this portion vent to Japan and Formosa;
defense considerations seem to have g.uided the difstributin of funds in
-1 Asmall fraction of aid to the Netherlands was used for the retherlands
~Est Indies (now Ind nes-ia).
this region. Latin America obtained less than 2 per cent of the total,
of which helf went to Brazil end Mexico--one relttively advanced country
and one neighbor. Thus while the United States has spent considerable
sums on foreign aid, it has spent rpther little on economic development
of underdeveloped areas.
Among agencies making loens for reconstruction and development, the
United States Export-Import Bank has operated on much the biggest scale.
In the allocation of its loans, however, the Eximbank has followed exactly
the same pattern revealed in American grants and loans as a whole. Much
the biggest share of total loans has gone to the relatively advanced
countries in Western Europe. Latin America has received a beggar t s portion
in comparison, and even within Latin America it has been the relatively
prosperous countries that have benefited most from Eximbank activities,
The Middle and Far East, most in need of capital assistance, have received
least of it from the Eximbanko
However, much the same criticism applies to the major United Nations
agency for provision of capitel assistance, the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development. At the meetings of the Bank and Fund in
Washington in September 1954, representatives of underdeveloped nations
were virtually unanimous in complaining that their requirements were not
being given sufficient consideration by these agencies. If policies of
these institutions could not be changed, they contended, new institutions
such as the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development should be
established.
In one sense these complaints were justified. It is not the underdeveloped
countries that have received most help from the Bank. Of the total loans
outstanding on June 30, 1954, only about 12.5 per cent had gone to Asia
and the Middle East, and a bit over 10 per cent to Africa. For both areas
electric power and transport constituted the purpose for the bulk of the
loans. Latin America accounted for neprly one-quarter of the loans out-
standing, but these went mainly to such relrtively highly developed
Latin American countries as Brazil and Chile. The capital requirements
of the underdeveloped countries will obviously not be met if ordinary
banking principles are applied0
Myrdal, quoting R. N. Bissell, makes an intriguing suggestion: ways
should be found of inducing the international capital market to play its
proper role in chrnnelling capital from countries where it is relatively
abundant to those where it is scarce. He believes that practical pro-
posals, based on careful research, would not fall on deaf ears. Professor
Myrdal has elaborated on this idea in conversation. He has pointed out that
financial institutions are no longer permitted to pursue shortsighted and
selfish profit-maximizing policies sofar as their domestic operations are
concerned. On the contrary, they have been compelled to serve the interests
of netional policy, including improvements in income distribution, main-
tenance of full employment without inflation, and the like. The problem
now is to make these institutions play a similar role internationally,
promoting the aims of agreed international policy.
To the reviewer, two things -seem essential to any such policy0 First,
capital must be provided in bigger lumps than private organizations have
hitherto found feasible0 In underdeveloped countries it often happens that
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each of a series of one hundred 41,000,000 loans would be rejected on
banking principles, while a single investment of $100,000,000 may be very
worthwhile indeed. Some means must be found to persuade private institu-
tions to make loans of this order. However, institutional rearrangements
would be necessary on the marketing side as well* For very often the
major benefits derived from such large scale investments are in the form of
"external economies", rpther than direct returns through sale of the
immediate product. Consequently, if such large units of investment are
to be made attractive to private enterprise, some means must be found of
permitting either the borrower or the lender to cash in on the external
economies as well as on the direct returns. These two requirements pro-
bably involve collective action by groups of financial institutions, and
we may need to recast our thinking about the merits and demerits of
"combination" in the field of finance.
The problem of inducing a larger volume of international capital
movements, however, is not merely one of increasing the supp of interna-
tional capital; in some of the countries that need it most, it is also a
matter of increasing the demand. Nationalist revolutions and the recent
emergence from colonialism, especially in the neutralist countries that
count most in this context, have left an aftermpth of suspicion of
foreign enterprise. In some of these countries there is a firm resolve not
to allow "foreign-monopoly-capitalist-imperialists" to gain access to the
country's "rich natural resources". Yet direct investment in resource
development is often the most attractive form of investment to foreigners.
One solution to this dilemma is the "management contract". Where
there is a lcrge domestic mrrket for an existing product, a contract can
sometimes be arranged whereby a national company is set up, with manage-
ment hired from a foreign company producing the product. The new national
company is granted licences to import from the foreign "managing" concern in
certain amounts and for certain periods. During this time the new company,
with technical and managerial advice from the foreign firm, builds a local
plant to produce the same commodity. The foreign firm might continue to
operate the new plant until it is possible for the host country to take
over the operation entirely. In the case of exports for which there is
no significant domestic mrrket, the foreign managing firm must set up a
plant immediately, which is not quite such an attractive proposition as a
rule. However, the arrangement can involve handsome profits for the foreign
concern even if they are disguised as management fees. Some management
contracts between Latin American countries and foreign oil companies have
actually proved more profitable to the companies than the usual "fifty-
fifty" arrangement. At the same time, the arrangement has the great advE'n-
tage that the ownership is nationlfrom start to finish.
But it is not only foreign investment that is suspect in these coun-
tries; foreign aid is equally carefully examined for possible threats to
sovereignty and independence. For this reason foreign aid with strings
attached is likely to fail in the very purposes for which the strings were
designed. Professor Myrdal quotes ex-Ambassador Chester Bowles (p. 127):
"Anyone who knows South Asia also knows that if Point Four aid seems to be
in any way tied to our military and alliance system it will be rejected by
most of the nations which are in greatest need of help". In short,
exacting a promise to fight on our side as a basis for aid may result in
these countries refusing aid and not fighting on our side.
Similarly, failure to provide aid to governments which are slightly
to the left of American taste may result in the United States having to
choose between an extreme right-wing or an extreme left-wing regimeo On
the point Iyrdal quotes E. J. Staley: "If we do not give vigorous support
to governments that are trying to move in progressive democratic directions
when they need it and want it we are likely to be forced into the position
later of having to back n government that is bad by our standards for the
sole reason that it is the only available alternative to a Communist regime".
Some observers have cor.tended that this sequence is exactly what happened
in China. It might bf' argued that the Egyptian crisis arose out of similar
attitudes; it is possible that wholehearted aid to Nasser's program for
economic developmeit would have prevented the whole Suez affair. There is
danger that failure to assist the Indian Governient without reservations
may have this result. Even in the Philippines, with their increasing dis-
parities in i'come and wealth, and rising unemployment combined with rising
national inr;ome, failure to provide assistance for the policies and
regimes that might be able to overcome these problems may someday face the
United Saates with the unpleasant choice between a fascist and a communist
regime, There is no denying the risk involved in providing economic aid to
gover-mients whose future international relations and domestic policies are
unc .rtain; but the risk attached to the alternative approach is -even greater,,
Myrdal also contends that the burden of foreign aid should be more
widely distributed. The United States is bearing more than its share, even
when world income and population are taken into account. He suggests that
the Scandinavian countries, for example, should accept a fuller share of
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th_2 responsibility. Some of the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland, and
Irance have launched small programs of technical assistance; but it is true
that these relatively prosperous countries are doing very little in the way of
capital assistance. Myrdal might have added that countries like Canada and
the United Kingdom are doing for less than their share on a per capita
income basis in comparison to the United States.
On the other hand, Myrdal admits that "the awkward fact of United
States bigness" makes truly international aid difficult (p. 130). "Under
any system of fair shares", he points out, "the material contribution of
the United States must be by far the largest of any country".0 Such being
the case, the United States is likely to choose to "go it alone" whenever
it really matters, to the detriment of development of international aid.
Unfortunately, there is another awkward fact to be considered; that the
Soviet type of economic organization "presents itself as fundamentally a
system for the development of underdeveloped countries" (p. l4h). More-
over, in Asian and African countries there does not exist the "high degree
of immunity against a spurt of sympathy for the Soviet system" that is
found in Western Europe, While the resistance to Communism provided by
I slam and village democracy in Asia should not be underestimated, there
can be no doubt that the Asian and African countries have relatively
little admiration for the economic system of the West, Islam is on
balance a Westernizing force in Asia, but the tendency to cling
to the form of village society is a barrier to development along
Western lines. The trouble is that we must sell our economic
and political system along with our aid. Here we are severely hand-
icapped because we no longer know exactly what our system isc Certainly
it is not Manchester liberalism that we want to sell to underdeveloped
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countries; and an articulate and integrated exposition of the economics and
politics of a managed society has yet to be written. Meanwhile, the cold
war makes us eager to attach strings--in the form of military agreements or
insistence on congenial regimes--with the effect of reducing the amount of
aid actually accepted and given, and opening the door for economic aid from
the Soviet bloc, with all that aid entails in influencing the future course
of the uncommitted countries.
Trade versus Aid
In the face of these difficulties in formulating an effective and
acceptable foreign aid program, it is not surprising that "trade not aid"
is a recurrent cry. Myrdal chooses to quote Professor Vinar in this regard:
"We should not use foreign aid as conscience-money payments for our tariff..,
a reduction of our trade barriers, which after fifteen years of being
whittled away still remain formidable, can be of greater benefit to other
countries than all the much advertized grants, loans, and technical aid"
(p. 290). M4yrdal gives qualified support for this view: "Indeed, one of
the substantial aids advanced countries could give underdeveloped countries
would be to use their bargaining power against them with greater considera-
tion".
But trade in what? Here we encounter one more awkward fact: advanced
countries are generally superior in production of foods and raw materials
as well as in manufacturing. One of the most distressing experiences of
the foreign economic adviser in underdeveloped countries is the discovery
that indigenous arricultural products are produced at very high cost, and
cannot compete in a free market with imports from more advanced countries,
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Thus one finds Louisiana rice competing with native rice in the Philippines,
imported dates competing with home-grown dates in Libya, and California
oranges out-selling the native product in the Riauw archipelago of Indonesia.
The simple truth is--as Myrdal contends by quoting Galbraith--that
"a purely agricultural country is likely to be unprogressive even in its
agriculture". Myrdal adds, "Industrialization creates technology which can
then be applied to agriculture but not vice versa" (p. 227).
Moreover, Myrdal argues, the present pattern of production and foreign
trade in underdeveloped countries is by no means a reflection of compara-
tive advantage, in terms of factor proportions and cost-price relationships.
On the dontrary, there is "cumulative process away from equilibrium in
factor proportions and factor prices, engendered by international trade"
because of the imbalance in the economies of underdeveloped areas. This
i"qbalance is not the result of merket forces, but a reflection of colonial
policy. "The governments of the metropolitan powers", Myrdal reminds us,
"were unable to undertake any great sacrifice in order to promote a general
and balanced industrial development of their dependencies. However, they
did conceive a clear interest in building up economic enclaves there...
and in treating- their dependencies as protected extensions of their home
markets for their industries." The drive for industrialization in under-
developed countries must be examined against this background0
In the reviewer's opinion this argument could be made in even stronger
terms. In most of the underdeveloped countries there is just no hope of
achieving high living standards through agricultural improvement alone.
Sheer arithmetic forbids any such possibility in many of' then. In India, for
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example, where soil and climr te are not suitable for a highly productive
agriculture, it is likely thet an output in excess of $200 per capita
(not per worker) in peasant agriculture is a technical impossibility so
long as the present size of peasant holdings continues, no matter how much
is done in introducing fertilizer, seed selection, improved irrigation, and
the like. And if 70 per cent of the labor force remains in agriculture,
the achievement of a per capita national income of 4400 per year then
becomes extremely difficult, and is clearly impossible without developing
an extremely efficient industrial sector employing the other 30 per cent of
the labor force. Even within single countries, the terms of trade tend to
move against agriculture and in favor of the industrial sector; this theorem
is even more true of trade between agricultural and industrial nations.
Strict application of the comparative advantage principle might well
lead to exactly the opposite policy. Soil and climrte are not transferable,
and populations are hard to move in large numbers. Techniques, however,
are easily moved, and become increasingly transferable with technological
progress. Thus while India may never have a highly efficient agriculture,
some observers maintain that it already has the most efficient iron and
steel industry in the world. On the basis of comperative advantage, India
should probably be an importer of foodstuffs and an exporter of products
of heavy industry. Similarly, it is virtually impossible to design an
gricultural program that would achieve high per capita income on the
island of Java, with its thousand people per square mile. But it is not at
all impossible to imagine an industrialization program that would achieve
relatively high per capita income for Indonesia, through the use of her
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mineral resources and her hydroelectric power potential. Indonesia could well
become an exporter of aluminium, tin, copper and the like.
In the past, arguments for diversification of economies have been
put just the wrong way around. It is not primarily in order to stabilize
an econonyr--as Myrdal suggests. The argument for diversification as a
means of reducing instability arose during a period when the extreme
instability of the American econonvr tended to spread outwards to other
countries, particularly producers of raw materials and foodstuffs. But
let us imagine that the United States succeeds in its brave hopes for
steady growth. Let us also imagine thet underdeveloped countries diversify
to the point of becoming self-sufficient, in investment as well as in pro-
duction. The main determinant of income and employment in these countries
would then be domestic investment. Since some of this investment would be
in risky enterprises, domestic investment could be very unstable indeed,
and consequently the economr as a whole might be subject to severe flue-
tuations. If these economies were relatively open, while the American
econonr was stable, international trade would tend to damp economic
fluctuations, Rising national income (inflation) would lead to diminished
exports and increased imports, thus checking the boom. Conversely, defla-
tion would lead to rising exports and reduced imports, damping the down-
swing. This whole question is one which needs re-examination when the
assumption that the dominant econonr is unstable is replaced by the
assumption that it is stable.
The main purpose of diversification is not stabilization but to permit
economic growth. If a country wants to increase its output at a faster
rate than the world market is expanding, it cannot be content with
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retaining its share in world markets. Industrialization is then a virtual
necessity. Even plantation products, where soil and climate advantages
are most clear cut, face doubtful futures because of increasing com-
petition from synthetics. At Lest, plantation products can expect a
gradual decline in their share of the world markets. Such a development is
not incompatible with absolute growth of plantation production, but it does
imply a falling share of plantation production in national production, if
-the country is to raise its income et a faster rate than world markets
expand. If productivity in plantations keeps pace with productivity in
industry--and if it does not, it is likely to lose out even more rapidly
to competing synthetics--the share of plantations in national employment
will also fall. Industrialization appears to be the only solution.
In short, it is not simply that balanced growth is better than un-
balanced growth; it is rather that these countries must have balanced
growth in order to have growth at all. These countries must have an agri-
cultural revolution as well as an industrial one. Myrdal quotes Tarlok
Singh, "Industrial expansion without agricultural reorganization will
leave the bulk of the people in a state of poverty. In other words, we
can plan against mass poverty only if we set out to create the conditions
of a rapidly expanding and efficient econonr both in agriculture and in
industryn (p. 206). Myrdal adds, "In most underdeveloped countries im-
provement of productivity in agriculture is, furthermore, an essential
pre-condition for industrialization."
This point is one worth emphasizing. As knowledge of agriculture in
underdeveloped countries has grown, the early easy optimism about trans-
ferring "disguised unemployed" from agriculture to industry has disappeared.
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It is recognized that in marV underdeveloped countries static disguised
unemployment in agriculture is at a very low level. That is, with present
size of holdings and present techniques, the entire labor force in the rural
sector is needed at planting and harvesting time. Substantial numbers
could not be released from agriculture without a drop in agricultural pro-
duction, unless the average size of holdings is increased ar'd some degree of
mechanization introduced. Cumulative improvement in agricultural pro-
ductivity on the basis of private initiative will not take place until this
initial jump to a more highly mechanized and larger-scale agriculture has
been made through government policy. Myrdal is more cautious: "Even if
the degree of mechanization in agriculture remains low until the far off
day when labor begins to be scarce, there will from the very beginning of
this process be a rising demand for tools." My own view is that we can
not await that far off day when labor becomes scarce, if we want early
improvement in per capita output; policy must be designed to make labor
relatively scarce in agriculture, by simultaneously shifting to a more
mechanized and larger-scale agriculture and encouraging a rapid rate of
industrialization. Stabilization is not entirely unimportant for under-
developed countries, and Myrdal makes a bow to international commodity
stabilization schemes (pp. 246-247). He fears (pp. 251-252) that repre-
sentatives of advanced countries will suspect the underdeveloped countries
of trying to get higher prices under the cloak of price stabilization. The
reviewer has put the point slightly differently:
It is true that some underdeveloped countries have suffered
substantially in the past from violent fluctuations in prices of
raw materials and foodstuffs. It is also true that if prices of
their exports were maintained at the levels reached, let us say,
at the peak of the Korean War boom, they would finance their own
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development programs--if they would. But here is the rub; people
in underdeveloped countries, no less than in advanced ones, tend
to think of the "fair" price as the highest price in the memory
of living man. Yet if prices were maintained at peak levels,
the danger is that the International Stabilization Authority
would find itself accumulating continually increasing stockpiles.
Distinguishing cyclical reductions in demand, which will be com-
pensated before long by a cyclical increase, from long run downward
trends, is difficult enough for ar group of objective experts.
How much more difficult such a distinction will be if deepseated
political considerations are also involved' Imagine, for example,
that careful study shows clearly that the cost of production of
synthetic rubber has a downward trend, while its range of use is
expanding. Will an International Stabilization Authority have the
courage to insist that in the light of this trend the fixed price
of natural rubber must be gradually reduced? If it has not, the
result will be that countries producing natural rubber will go on
producing it for the Authority's stockpile, instead of under-
taking the structural reorganization of their economies that the
situation demands. 1
Commercial Policy
The unbalanced economies of underdeveloped countries call for special
policies; Myrdal speaks of a "double standard" with regard to foreign
trade policies, one standard being applicable to advanced countries and the
other to underdeveloped ones. With this point the reviewer heartily agrees.
The classical dicta with regard to free trade were based on a kind of
marginal analysis which is quite inappropriate where the problem is one
of inducing large discontinuous jumps to a completely new structure and
level of employment and output. Indeed, given the degree of misallocation
of resources already existing in underdeveloped countries, relative to what
could be achieved through such a "big push", it may well be that any
"distortion" of the price-cost structure through government intervention
would bring an improvement. Certainly a properly planned intervention will
improve rather thar worsen the resource allocation of underdeveloped
countries.
Benjamin Higgins, Financing Development of Underdeveloped Areas,
Center for International Studies, ?.I.T., March 1955, Doc. Control #a/55-1.
Myrdal is lukewarm with regard to cooperation among underdeveloped
countries with respect to foreign trade. He does not der that such
cooperation may have its uses, but he says that "the scope for such a
cooperation is naturally limited, as almost by definition partnership is
more natural between underdeveloped and developed countries than between
underdeveloped countries by themselves". This statement seems somewhat
inconsistent with Myrdal' s insistence that underdeveloped countries be
permitted-and indeed urged-to industrialize and shift to a more exten-
sive and mechanized agriculture. If this were done, it is by no means
clear that cooperation among underdeveloped countries is less natural than
with advanced ones. It is the reviewer's opinion that regional planning
among countries in Asian and Africa is long overdue. Industrialization is
not tantamount to every country endeavoring to produce everything, and
some integration of national plans to avoid costly overlapping is surely
desirable. For example, it may be advantageous for both countries for
Indonesia to leave iron and steel production to the Philippines, while the
Philippines stays out of rubber and aluminium, and does not expand its
petroleum refining capacity. Such questions require careful study, but if
the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East could be made an effective
agency for international planning, this kind of question is one that they
might well tackle.
Meanwhile, import replacers are the most hopeful avenue for indus-
trial development. Myrdal points out that both the price elasticity and
income elasticity of demand for agricultural products is very low, while the
marginal propensity to import of agricultural countries is high. Consequently,
if underdeveloped countries are not to run into serious drains on their
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foreign exchange balances through their efforts to develop, they must find
either new exports or import replacers. The latter is clearly easier. In
the case of Indonesia, for example, the two avenues of development which
seem most promising, especially as regards the balances of payment, are
processing one or more stages further of their own raw materials (petro-
leum, tin, bauxite, and the like) or the development of import replacing
industries, especially in the island of Java with its concentrated market.
The former is a more :capital-intensive process than the latter. There is
nothing unnatural about this sort of development; on the contrary, it is
precisely the kind of development that was delayed by the colonial policy.
The "precarious balance" in which underdeveloped countries find
themselves, with the danger thatlarge-scale development investment will
lead to both inflation and a drain on foreign exchange, is in Myrdal' s
view an added reason for import controls (p. 272). Of all kinds of possible
import restrictions, multiple exchange rates come closest to being "a free
trader' s dream" Mlyrdal suggests. Recent Indonesian experience would seem
to support this contention; in 1956, thanks to higher advance payments
and import surcharges, it was possible to let the market govern foreign
exchange allocations and grant virtually all applications for import
licenses. 1
Myrdal points out that if economic development plans are successful,
import restrictions do not involve a decline in total imports of under-
developed countries. They imply rather a shift in the composition of
imports, while limiting the increase as national income goes up.
'This experience is analyzed more fully in B. Hig gins, Economic Stabiliza-
tion and Development In Indonesia, New York (IPR), 1957.
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Responsibility of the United States
Myrdal does not hesitate to place the major onus for development of an
international economy upon the United States. The sheer size of the country's
economy makes this position inevitable. A country with half the world' s
industrial capacity cannot escape assuming major responsibility for pro-
motion of international economic integration. By the same token, the con-
tinuing protectionism of the United States is an international disaster.
"The United States, with a gross national product now exceeding three
hundred and fifty billion dollars a year,...having since Cordell Hull' s
time assumed the leadership in a virtual world crusade to break down the
barriers to international trade, does not see its way to permit the few
hundred million--or at most a few billion--dollars a year of additional
imports of various commodities that would follow a lowering of its own
trade barrier" (p. 40).
The United States also has the major responsibility for stabilization
of international commodity markets. What are small fluctuations in Ameri-
can demand for imports are disastrously large fluctuations in demand for
exports of other countries. Yet, Myrdal points out, the Randall Report
hardly mentions the American responsib5lities in this rcgard. International
stabilization requires that the United States should increase the supply of
dollars in periods of recession. Myrdal considers it unlikely that such a
policy could be pursued. However, with the new commitment to maintenance
of full employment, hopes that a recession at home would be followed by
expansion of foreign aid and investment are more justified now than they
might have been some decades ago.
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Particularly unfortunate in Myrdal' s view is the manner in which
the United States Government acts as a destablizing speculator, when it
should act as a stabilising speculator through its stock-piling policy.
The American Government's behavior during the Korean War "greatly re-
enforced the fluctuations of raw material prices and had far reaching un-
stabilizing effects on the economies of European countries as well as of
countries in Asia and Latin America" (p. 143).
Apart from fluctuations in the supply of dollars, there is the per-
sistent dollar shortage, which is a major barrier to development of a
truly international econony. The difficulty is simply that the foreign
aid and investment of the United States is not commenserate to its im-
portance in world merkets. "The present dollar problem', Myrdal maintains,
"is largely due to the fact that the econon of the United States is not
like that of the Britain in the nineteenth century and that the United
States does not follow today the commercial and financial policies that
Britain then did." This point has been made in more graphic terms by
Professor Cairncross. For the United States to play the same role today
that Great Britrin did in the nineteenth century, relative to resources,
American foreign investment would have to reach $600 billion and the entire
Marshall Plan would have to be carried out twice every year',1
Given its trade position, Myrdal adds, the United States should be a
debtor country. Yet investment conditions are such that the American
econony is more attractive to lenders, even in underdeveloped countries.
However, this situation need not be disturbing provided the scale of loans
and grants from the United States for long-term development purposes is
1A. K. Cairncross, Home and Foreign Investment, 1870-93, Cambridge, 1953, p. 3.
sufficiently large. An influx of capital for short-term investment from
underdeveloped countries in the United States increases to that degree the
capacity of the United States for making foreign loans and grants for
development purposes without current sacrifices on the part of the American
people. The important thing is that any such reverse flow of capital
should be more than offset by the loan and grant program.
Myrdal also places on the United States the blame for the wave of
restrictions on immigration following World War I. He quotes Gustav Cassel
as looking upon the inauguration of the United States immigration bars
after the First World War as "a most sinsiter cause of long-term world
disequilibrium" (p. 80). The wave of immigration restrictions after the
war are in his opinion the direct result of the American quota legislation
of 1921 and 1924.
Myrdal, with his long standing interest in the American negro pro-
blem, also makes a telling observation about its impact on international
relations. He reminds his readers that in Asian and African countries
there is a feeling of identification with the negroes, and that maltreat-
ment of American negroes undermines the relationships of the United States
with the Asian and African countries. "Few Americans", he says, "even
among the most internationally versatile, can really appreciate the
tremendous positive effects in international relations of the recent Supreme
Court decision outlawing educational segregation."
Finally, we come to the pattern and form of American aid, While
Myrdel exonerates the United Stetes from major responsibility for failure
1This point was first suggested to me by Professor Eugene Grasberg.
of the OEEC, he does note a tendency for the United States to interfere in
the internal policies of European countries towards the end of this ex-
periment in economic integretion. At the very least, he suggests that some
lessons with regard to American policy in Asia and Africa might be learned
from the failure of this experiment. The unfortunate geographic pattern of
American aid up to the end of 1954 has already been noted. However, there
seems to be hope now that this error at least will be rectified in the
near future.
The present problem is a more subtle one. How can "doller diplomacy"
be carried out without being recognized as such? It is natural that the
United States should wish to see countries in Asia and Africa develop in
some directions and not in others. It is also naturpl that she should use
her capital and technical assistance as one instrument for achieving these
aims. Yet the blatant use of capital assistpnce as a reward for "good
behavior" can boomerang in a quite disastrous fashion. "Doller diplomacy"
can be effective only if it is not recognized as such. Underdeveloped
countries need both aid and advice; but whenever there is any suggestion
that acceptance of advice is a prerequisite to obtaining aid, both are
likely to fail in their objectives. As lVyrdal puts it, "The world cannot be
run as a company town."
In this respect the present mode of operation of ICA is unfortunate.
The same American Government agency administers both capital and technical
assistance, and the latter sometimes includes advice on policy questions.
On the face of it, it is inappropriate for an employee of one government to
advise another government on major policy issues. Such a relationship is
0all the more likely to cause resentment if the advice-giving government is
also the economically and militarily powerful one. Worse, with this
organisation the temptation to suggest that technical and capital assis-
tance are linked is too strong to be resisted by all American advisers.
Some of them have been quite open in suggesting that continued capital
assistance depends on their advice being taken: "I do not know whether we
can persuade Congress to continue aid to your country on the same scale
next year if your government persists in its mistaken policy, etc." Such
behavior is rightly regarded by the recipient country as an infringement
on its sovereignty and independence.
Moreover, a common procedure is for ICA to have its own building where
experts have their offices and report to the Director of the Mission. They
advise the Director on his capital assistance program as well as advising
the host government on its policy. With such an arrangement it is almost
inevitable that people in the recipient countries will link aid to advice,
even if ICA officials do everything in their power to keep them apart. The
usual practice with United Nations, Colombo Plan, or ICA-contract advisers,
on the contrary, is for them to have their desks in that department of the
host government which they are assisting, and to advise no government
other than the recipient one.
The danger of a "boomerang- effect" from United States aid could be
minimised by having an international agency review development programs as
a whole as a basis for capital assistance, along the lines suggested by
Professors Millikan and Rostow; and where possible by having technical
1Max F. Millikan and W. W. Rostow, A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign
Policy, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1957.
assistance of a kind influencing policy (there is a lot of difference be-
tween an expert on rodent control and an economic adviser) provided through
the United Nations or Colombo Plan. If this procedure is impossible for
political or administrative reasons, at the very least American advisers
should be ICA-contract personnel rather than ICA officials. They can then
have their offices in the building of the host government, be independent
of the ICA Director, and give advice oly to the host government. This
last alternative is less satisfactory than the first two because the danger
of a "boomerang" increases with sheer numbers of American advisers in any
country; but it is better than some present arrangements.
Although it may seem ungracious for a Canadian to say so, the reviewer
cannot but agree with Professor Myrdal that the major responsibility for
developing an integrated internetionpl economy lies with the United States.
As a mitigating circumstance, the reviewer might plead that he has been
openly critical of his own country for fai ling so dismelly to perform its
proper role in relations between the West and underdeveloped countries.
But only the United States has the resources to assure successful develop-
ment along non-Communist lines of the Asia-Africa and Latin America
countries. 'ider understanding of the nature of the problem is probably
the major prerequisite to an effective United States foreign policy. It
is to be hoped that Professor Myrdal's book, which is so clearly and
simply written, will be widely read, particularly in this country.
